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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2029
TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [KACT](#) [START](#) [JCIC](#) [US](#) [KTIA](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO THE U.S./RUSSIA
NEGOTIATIONS ON A START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, MOSCOW, JUNE 16,
2009

REF: A. STATE 41125
[1](#)B. STATE 50911
[1](#)C. STATE 50910
[1](#)D. STATE 60487
[1](#)E. STATE 60343

Classified By: Jerry A. Taylor, Director, VCI/SI.
Reason: 1.4(b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, is scheduled to continue negotiations regarding a START follow-on treaty with Russian MFA Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy Antonov, during meetings of the U.S. and Russian Delegations in Moscow on June 16, 2009.

[1](#)2. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw, as necessary, from the points in Ref A and Ref B with regard to U.S. views relating to a START follow-on treaty. Delegation may draw from the U.S. non-paper on the Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty (Ref C), the U.S.-proposed Joint Understanding (Ref D) and the U.S. non-paper on counting SNDVs and ODSNW (Ref E) to explain U.S. views with respect to a START Follow-on treaty. Delegation should report on all meetings as expeditiously as possible.

[1](#)3. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) In response to the Russian non-paper, "How the Russian Side Envisions the New START Treaty" (June 1, 2009), Delegation may provide the text below to the Russian Delegation in the form of a non-paper.

Begin text.

U.S. Non-paper

(Date)

U.S. Comments on the paper of the Russian Side: "How the Russian Side Envisions the new START Treaty"

The United States notes that in a number of significant areas the views of the United States and the Russian Federation, as stipulated in their respective papers, appear to coincide to a substantial degree. There are, of course, other areas where our views are markedly different. The purpose of this paper is to provide U.S. views on the specific proposals made in the Russian paper, and where possible, to note the areas of congruence.

[1](#)1. Title of the Treaty: Although the United States does not object to the title proposed by the Russian Federation for the new treaty, we do not believe it is something that needs to be decided now. The United States agrees that the new treaty will be strictly bilateral.

[1](#)2. Structure of the Treaty:

a. Preamble: Although there may be some redundancy in the proposed preamble elements, the United States does not object in principle to the Russian proposals. The United States acknowledges that the Russian Federation has concerns regarding U.S. missile defense programs, and is addressing these concerns on their own merit in a separate venue; however the United States recognizes that there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, but believes that it does not need to be addressed now in the context of the START follow-on treaty. As the sides draft the text for the new treaty, the United States will be willing to consider language Russia may propose for the preamble that includes a general reference to this interrelationship on the understanding that this would be the only reference to defensive arms in the new treaty.

b. General Provisions: The proposal to reduce and limit strategic offensive arms both "quantitatively and qualitatively" was not sufficiently explained in the Russian paper, especially with respect to what qualitative limitations are being proposed by Russia, including how the sides might verify the qualitative nature of such reductions and limitations. The United States opposes inclusion of any limitations on ballistic missile defense systems within the context of the proposed new treaty, which as instructed by our Presidents in their April 1, 2009, Joint Statement, is to be focused on strategic offensive arms.

c. Maximum levels: The United States does not object to the proposed seven-year reduction period. The United States acknowledges that the term "warhead," as used in the U.S. paper, does not correspond with the meaning of that term in the START Treaty. However, as was pointed out in the U.S. paper, some START terminology and definitions will need to be changed to meet the needs of the new treaty.

d. Counting Procedures: The United States has provided separately an explanation of the U.S. proposal for counting ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and is prepared to discuss it during the sessions of our talks in Geneva later this month.

e. Data Base: The U.S. and Russian proposals with respect to maintaining a data base appear to be similar, although details on newly constructed SOAs and exceptions for specified missiles will have to be clarified.

f. Location: The United States does not object to the concept of locational restrictions for SOAs; however, the United States opposes the proposed restriction on the basing of SOA only within the "continental portion" of each Party's national territory. The United States does not object to inclusion of provisions similar to those in the START Treaty that would address the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside national territory (but not the "continental portion" of national territory), in conjunction with the development of less stringent notification requirements for the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty.

g. Additional Limitations: The United States opposes the Russian-proposed bans on ICBMs or SLBMs in non-nuclear configuration, as well as a ban on stationing heavy bombers with long-range nuclear ALCMs outside the continental portion of a Party's national territory.

h. Notifications: The United States agrees that the new treaty should retain the START notification regime, with adaptations as appropriate.

i. Elimination and Conversion: The United States agrees that conversion or elimination procedures should be made simpler and less expensive, while ensuring those

procedures provide effective verification.

j. Confidence-Building Measures: The United States supports the development of suitable confidence building measures and believes the sides will need to consider whether they will be contained in the new treaty or be recorded in documents that are not part of the formal treaty.

k. Use of NTM: The United States supports carrying forward the START provisions associated with NTM. However, the United States does not believe that NTM and the verification measures proposed by the Russian Federation alone would be sufficient to provide effective verification of the Treaty as directed by our Presidents, particularly as it pertains to verification of mobile ICBMs. Therefore, other START verification measures should also be carried forward.

l. Inspections, Visits and Exhibitions: The United States supports the development of the Russian proposals regarding inspections, visits, and exhibitions; however these matters and the distinctions between inspections and visits will need to be explored and developed in more detail. The United States supports inclusion of provisions according privileges and immunities for inspectors and aircrew members.

m. Bilateral Consultative Commission: The United States supports the establishment of an oversight body and agrees that questions that do not affect the substance of the treaty can be referred to such a body for consideration and decision, in which case they would not be considered to be amendments to the treaty and thus not subject to ratification.

n. Entry into force and Termination: The United States does not object to the 10-year treaty duration proposed by the Russian Federation, but opposes the proposal to include specific reference to certain activities as cause for withdrawal from the treaty. The United States supports a withdrawal clause that invokes the supreme national interest as reason for withdrawal. The United States supports superseding the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty with the new treaty at entry into force of the new treaty.

End text.
CLINTON